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T HE DECISIVE TEST FOR ANY RULE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW is whether, to the soldier in an active combat situation, it would appear to be an in~ 
stinctively apparent and reasonable rule. In my experience as a teacher and lec~ 
turer, I have found that any initial skepticism soldiers may have as to the laws of 
war is quickly dispelled when one enumerates the basic norms of humanitarian 
law. 1 No soldier, in my experience, has ever seriously questioned Common Ar~ 
tide 32 norms such as respect for civilians, persons hOTS de combat, and prisoners 
of war. From that initial premise, a teacher finds it easier to proceed to the more 
involved rules that often require legal training for their effective implementa~ 
tion. 
If a rule of humanitarian law fails the instinctive morality test of the combat 
soldier, that rule will most probably not be applied in actual combat. Although 
the rule may be applied in a forensic post mortem as part of a military disciplinary 
court, we will not have achieved our objective, namely that it be applied by sol~ 
diers in the heat of battle. 
Does the rule as to protection of airmen3 in distress pass the decisive test? 
Would it seem to ground troops to be instinctively wrong and immoral to fire 
on a crew parachuting from a military aircraft in distress? There seems to be 
near unanimity in the manuals and legal textbooks that, in principle, airmen 
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parachuting from an aircraft in distress are to be considered hOTs de combat dur~ 
ing their descent and should be treated as such.4 
The first attempt to draft the rule in codified form was in the 1923 Hague 
Rules of Air Warfare, which stated: 
Article 20 
When an aircraft has been disabled, the occupants, when endeavouring to 
escape by means of parachute, must not be attacked in the course of their 
descent.5 
The Commission ofJurists who drew up this rule did not claim at the time 
that they were codifying customary law but only that it "seemed desirable to 
prohibit" such forms of "injuring the enemy."6 The rule, however, appears to 
have been viewed as uncontroversial and was accepted without debate.7 State 
practice and judicial opinion since then point to the development of the rule 
into international custom. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) referred to it in 1971 as "a common~law rule,"s and Bothe, Partsch, and 
Solf write, "withholding attack against airmen descending from a disabled air~ 
craft had certainly hardened into customary internationallaw."9 DeSaussure 
states that "while descending air crewmen were occasionally attacked in World 
War II in areas where their capture was not probable, the practice in Korea, 
Indochina, and the Mideast points to a developing custom which unconditionally 
exempts any occupant leaving a disabled aircraft from being attacked either 
from the air or from the ground."IO 
The issue of protection of airmen in distress was extensively debated during 
the Humanitarian Law Conference. 11 The rule, as finally adopted in Article 42 
of Protocol 1,12 states: 
Article 42 
1. No person parachuting from an aircraft in distress shall be made the object of 
attack during his descent. 
2. Upon reaching the ground in territory controlled by an adverse Party, a person 
who has parachuted from an aircraft in distress shall be given an opportunity to 
surrender before made the object of attack, unless it is apparent that he is 
engaging in a hostile act. 
3. Airborne troops are not protected by this Article. 
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Four of the issues of principle concerning airmen in distress that were raised 
during the Conference were: 
\Xfhat is the justification for granting special protection to ainnen? 
Does the rule apply to ainnen in distress parachuting onto friendly territory? 
What behaviour by the ainnen during descent, if any, negates the protection? 
\Xfhat protection is to be granted to ainnen in distress once they have landed? 
Justification for the Protection Granted to Airmen in Distress 
The practice of not shooting at an airman in distress appears to have been 
part of the mutual chivalry of airmen in the 1st World War. Spaight, the lead~ 
ing authority on this issue, wrote, some fifty years ago, that "the effect of the use 
of aircraft in war was at first to restore to warfare something of the spirit which 
went out with the Middle Ages. After 600 years, chivalry re~emerged in strange 
company. "13 Spaight also adds a very practical argument that there is a military 
advantage to encouraging enemy airmen to abandon their aircraft since "if air~ 
men know that, if they escape by parachute, they will become an easy target 
during their descent, it will incline them to harden their hearts and to remain at 
their post."14 
As part of preparations for reviewing the laws of war,15 in 1969 the ICRC 
convened a conference of experts. Among the issues raised was that of airmen 
in distress, with the Report of the Conference focusing on the comparison be~ 
tween airmen in distress and "a shipwrecked individual." 16 However, the Con~ 
ference did ~ot propose specific language. The ICRC position paper presented 
to the subsequent 1971 Conference of Experts did propose a specific provision 
on airmen in distress, explaining it in terms of "presumption of harmlessness" 
and "giving the individual the benefit of the doubt."17 The Israeli delegation, 
which submitted a proposal of its own at the Conference,18 explained that an 
airman "having parachuted from his aircraft, is in a state of helplessness and 
military ineffectiveness, and (should) be considered hors de combat."19 At the 
second session of the Conference, in 1972, the ICRC presented a revised 
text.20 The commentary thereto submitted by the ICRC again referred to the 
"shipwrecked" analogy.21 The report of the second session of the Conference 
did not include a discussion of the justification of the need for such an article.22 
The issue of the justification, if any, for granting special protection to airmen 
beyond that granted to other combatants was debated during the 
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Humanitarian Law Conference. One of the justifications raised was the idea of 
chivalry. The delegate from Belgium declared that "there was a tradition 
among fighter pilots that a pilot who had been shot down should be considered 
to be in a similar situation to that of a rider unhorsed in battle" and that it was a 
"rule of chivalry."z3 The Canadian representative categorically stated that 
shooting at an airman in distress "would run counter to the entire tradition of 
chivalry, for the very idea of shooting in cold blood at a human being descend, 
ing by parachute in distress and probably already wounded, was monstrous."Z4 
The delegate of the Netherlands limited himself in this respect to hoping that 
"all States would carry chivalry beyond the limits imposed by the legal rule as 
now adopted."Z5 By contrast, Egypt's delegate, although accepting the rule in 
principle, objected to the introduction of the justification of chivalry and 
pointed out that 
one could look at the situation from the standpoint of chivalry but that would be 
rather strained and exaggerated. Because chivalry presupposed equality of 
opportunity in fighting, it implied giving the adversary the opportunity to fight 
for his life, to kill or be killed. To adopt that concern for chivalry in the situation 
under discussion would be pushing it too far, because infantrymen were by no 
means equal in armament to a pilot. If they were ordered to let him go, he would 
return and fight them, not with a simple rifle-the same weapon that they 
had-but with a fighter aircraft equipped with all the means of destruction which 
the human mind had been able to devise and put into use ... considerable 
military interests must not be sacrificed to mere considerations of chivalry.Z6 
Mr. de Preux, of the ICRC, referred to the fact that although airmen in dis, 
tress are covered by the general rule as to hors de combat, "the importance of 
aviation in modem conflicts warranted the adoption of a special provision to 
ensure the normal functioning of air operations and the protection of air' 
men."Z7 During the plenary discussions of the Conference, Mr. Pictet, on be, 
half of the JCRC, explained that "the serviceman who, to save his life, para, 
chuted from an aircraft in distress was a victim, shipwrecked as it were in the air 
and that was the idea which should have precedence."z8 The representative of 
Israel stressed that such an airman was hors de combat and should not be at, 
tacked for that reason, Z9 while the delegate from the Federal Republic of Ger, 
many forcefully declared that "a person parachuting from an aircraft in distress 
was reduced to helplessness in the true sense of the word during his descent and 
an attack on him would be tantamount to an execution. "30 Possibly summaris, 
ing the essence of the justification for the rule, the Portugese delegate stated 
that in such circumstances the airman "could neither defend himself nor attack 
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norescape."31 De Preux, in the ICRC Commentary on Article 42, refers to past 
"cameraderie" between airmen but observes, I believe correctly, that as regards 
the delegates at the Humanitarian Law Conference, "the majority considered 
that airmen in distress are comparable to the shipwrecked persons protected by 
the Second Convention."32 
It may be regrettable that chivalry is no longer with us, but I believe it is 
healthier for the development of humanitarian law to base the norm on the ac, 
cepted definition of a combatant who is hors de combat rather than dwell on 
analogies to battling knights. 
Does the Rule Apply to Aircrews About to Land in Their 
Own Territory or in Friendly Territory? 
The 1923 Hague Air Rules do not distinguish between an airman parachut, 
ing over hostile territory and one parachuting over friendly territory. Spaight 
appears, however, to leave the rule as to protection of airmen parachuting over 
their own territory open to question. He writes that "when the descent is over 
ground held by the forces hostile to those to which the parachutist belongs, to 
shoot him is at once inhumane and a waste of ammunition. He must be cap, 
tured in any case, if he succeeds in landing."33 If the justification for protection 
is, as Spaight seems to suggest, only the certainty of capture, then there is no 
justification for granting protection if the airmen parachute over friendly terri, 
tory. If, however, the justification is, as I believe it is, humanitarian and analo, 
gous to the protection of those shipwrecked at sea, then the question of where 
an airman is about to land is irrelevant. 
The 1969 ICRC Report enumerates "the nationality of the territory on 
which they are to land" as one of the factors some experts thought should be 
considered.34 In its report to the 1971 Experts Conference, the ICRC com, 
men ted that "such a view is incompatible with humanitarian principles" and 
set out the rule without any mention as to territory.35 The draft rule proposed 
by Israel in 1971,36 and by the ICRC in 1972,37 contained no reference to 
whether aircrews in distress were about to land in friendly territory or in terri, 
tory controlled by the enemy. The proposed rule was unequivocal as to the pro' 
tection to be granted while the airmen were descending by parachute.38 The 
1971 Israeli proposal stated that "airmen in distress shall not be attacked in the 
cou,rse of their descent,"39 and the 1972 ICRC text proposed that the occu, 
pants of aircraft in distress "shall not be attacked during their descent."40 The 
commentary by the ICRC to the 1972 Conference did not refer to the issue of 
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where the airmen might land.41 The question, however, was raised during the 
1972 Conference by one expert who 
stressed that a flyer in distress could sometimes guide his parachute so as to 
reach the territory controlled by his own forces and that, in this case, by 
virtue of international-law, he could be attacked like an enemy who was not 
really hors de combat and who attempted to elude capture.42 
The text proposed by the ICRC in 1973 to the Humanitarian Law Confer, 
ence reaffirmed the principle of protection of occupants of an aircraft in dis, 
tress "when they are obviously lwrs de combat," but omitted any explicit 
reference to protection during descent.43 However, basing itself on military 
manuals, the ICRC Commentary to the 1973 Draft stated that it was irrelevant 
whether the aircraft occupants were due to land on territory controlled by 
friendly or hostile forces.44 At the first session of the Humanitarian Law Con' 
ference, the Israeli delegation proposed an amendment to the basic ICRC text, 
which included the phrase that an airman in distress "would be considered hors 
de combat during the course of his descent."45 
At the third session of the Humanitarian Law Conference, the Third Com' 
mittee formed a working group to discuss the article dealing with airmen in dis, 
tress. The Rapporteur, George Aldrich, reported that 
A number of delegations stated that immunity from attack during descent would 
be unrealistic in a case where it were clear that the airman would return to his 
armed forces by landing in territory controlled by them or by an ally. Many other 
delegations argued, on the contrary, that an airman descending by parachute 
should be considered temporarily hors de combat for humanitarian reasons until 
he reaches the ground.46 
He consequently submitted the following proposal, with the disputed phrase 
in square brackets: 
1. No person parachuting from an aircraft in distress shall be made the object of 
attack during his descent [unless it is apparent that he will land in territory 
controlled by the party to which he belongs or by an ally of that party.] 
The Egyptian delegation, which had proposed t~e phrase in square brackets, 
decided to withdraw its proposal. Notwithstanding the Egyptian withdrawal, it 
was put to vote at the insistence ofIraq and adopted by the Third Committee.47 
A number of delegations, including those of the United Kingdom, Federal Re, 
public of Germany, Canada, Israel, and Belgium, consequently found 
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themselves voting against the Article as a whole. Stating that the amendment 
adopted was such "as to change existing law," the UK delegation found it "hard 
to accept. "48 The delegate of the Federal Republic of Germany explained that 
his delegation had objected to the amendment because "the mere possibility 
that he might resume combat activities did not deprive a person of the protec~ 
tion to which he was entitled, "49 and the Canadian delegate expressed hope 
that those delegations that had supported the amendment "would withdraw 
their proposal."50 The Israeli delegation labeled' the amendment "in contradic~ 
tion with existing law,"51 while the U.S. delegate declared that the amendment 
would be incompatible with the other provisions of humanitarian law ... which 
provided that persons that had fallen into the power of an adverse Party under 
unusual conditions of combat, which prevented their evacuation, must be 
released. Those prisoners, too, could resume combat, but it was inadmissible that 
they should all be shot. By the same token, it was inadmissible that a parachutist 
hOTS de combat could be shot down, on the pretext that he might resume his 
military activities.52 
At the final session of the Conference, the Working Group decided to re~ 
open the issue, its Rapporteur reporting: 
The Working Group proposes amending the text of this paragraph to prohibit 
attacks against airmen descending by parachute, regardless of which Party 
controls the territory into which they are descending. It was felt that an airman 
in this situation is temporarily hors de combat as effectively as if he wert! 
unconscious and that it would be inappropria~e for a Protocol designed to 
expand humanitarian protections to authorize making him a legitimate object of 
attack while in that helpless position.53 
In an unusual move, Committee III decided to reconsider the Article and to 
adopt it without the phrase in square brackets.54 
A proposal by Sixteen Arab and other States proposing reintroduction of 
the qualification as to the territory where the airman would land was later sub~ 
mitted to the Plenary of the Conference.55 In introducing the Sixteen State 
proposal, the Syrian delegate explained that there was no cause to give privi~ 
leged treatment to "a person descending by parachute who was obviously trying 
to escape to a territory controlled by his country, or by a friendly country."56 
Iraq's representative stated that it "was not possible to remain a mere spectator 
in the midst of ruins and see the dead, and to watch the descent of airmen ready 
to start again at the first opportunity."57 Similarly, Libya's delegate argued that 
it was not "human to give a chance to pilots ordered to destroy countries,"58 
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,and the Sudanese delegate asserted that "a pilot forced to bail out from a 
doomed aircraft should not be considered to be hors de combat ifhe attempts to 
land on territory controlled by his own side or its allies, for his attempt indicates 
his intention to land in a safe place and to continue fighting immediately after 
he has landed.59 Mr. Pictet, on behalf of the ICRC, vociferously objected to the 
Sixteen State proposal, stating that it would 
introduce into the Conventions an element that was outside their framework 
and contrary to their spirit ... whether an ainnan landed in friendly or hostile 
territory, whether he rejoined his unit or was taken prisoner, should remain 
secondary considerations. A shipwrecked person was a victim of the conflict 
and should be protected in all circumstances. The ICRC would be dismayed 
to see a provision making it lawful to kill an unanned enemy, who was not 
himself in a position to kill, introduced into law which had hitherto been 
purely humanitarian. It would set a dangerous precedent.60, 61 
The Sixteen State amendment was put to the vote and defeated.62 
The text, as finally adopted, makes no distinction as regards the territory 
where the parachutist is likely to land. The clear rule is that one does not shoot 
at a person parachuting from an aircraft in distress. It is, I believe, a reflection of 
a rule of customary international law. 
Hostile Attitude during Descent? 
If an aircraft carrying paratroopers or other airborne troops is in distress, 
clearly the troops who parachute from such an aircraft are not necessarily hors 
de combat. Theoretically, even an airman parachuting from an aircraft in dis, 
tress who attempts to use a weapon during his descent is not at the time hors de 
combat. 
The various drafters of the provision providing protection to airmen in dis, 
tress attempted to find a way to exclude these two categories from the protec, 
tion of persons hors de combat. Participants at the 1969 Experts Conference, 
"generally admitted that an airmen in distress, cut off and not employing any 
weapon, should be respected."63(Emphasis added.) The 1971 Istaeli proposal 
contained no reference to hostile behaviour by an airman; however, the text 
presented by the ICRC in 1972 conditioned the protection of airmen in distress 
by the phrase "unless their attitude is hostile."64 At the 1972 Conference, a 
question was raised as to the definition of the phrase "hostile attitude,"65 but no 
expert appears to have objected to the principle of such a restriction. Proposals 
submitted by the U.S. and GDR repeated the reference to "hostile attitude" 
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used in the ICRC text.66 The text presented by the ICRC to the 1973 Humani, 
tarian Law Conference did not contain any reference to "hostile attitude," pre, 
sumably since the ICRC had widened the scope of the protection to include 
occupants of an aircraft even prior to their abandoning the aircraft. 
Israel submitted a proposal to the first session of the Humanitarian Law 
Conference which added the following to the'ICRC text: 
2. A person parachuting from an aircraft in distress and whose attitude in the 
course of his descent is not manifestly hostile shall be considered hOTs de 
combat during the course of his descent.67 
The Israeli proposal thus combined an explicit reference to persons 
parachuting in distress with a restriction as to hostile attitude. At the second 
session of the Conference, Egypt and other Arab States proposed replacing the 
general protection for the occupants of an aircraft in distress proposed by the 
ICRC with a reference to "persons parachuting from aircraft in distress ... 
provided they are obviously hors de combat."68 
During the discussion in Committee III, and in the Working Group on the 
subject, there was general support for the idea of restricting the protection to 
persons who had abandoned the aircraft. Occupants of an aircraft in distress 
would thus not be entitled to protection until they had actually parachuted 
from the aircraft.69 As to "hostile attitude" during descent, there was general 
agreement on "explicitly excepting airborne troops from the protection of the 
article, even if they were forced to leave their aircraft."70 The Working Group 
proposed adding the phrase "Airborne troops are not protected by this Article," 
a proposal adopted by Committee III and the Conference as a whole. With the 
addition of specific language relating to airborne troops, the Working Group 
and, subsequently, Committee III and the Conference as a whole decided that 
any other reference to "hostile attitude" during descent was superfluous. Dur, 
ing the final session of the Conference, the Philippine delegation proposed add, 
ing the phrase "unless he commits a hostile act during such descent."71 
France's delegate objected, stating "he knew from personal experience that it 
was impossible for a person parachuting from an aircraft to use his weapon dur, 
ing the descent, for at that time his sole concern was to prepare for landing."n 
Along the same lines, Switzerland's delegate commented that "he failed to see 
its practical bearing."73 The delegate of the Federal Republic of Germany 
thought "it involved some risk, because it might be very widely interpreted,"74 
and Iran's delegate pointed out that "such a provision might lead to abuse, for 
once a parachutist had been fired on, it would be easy to find reasons to jus, 
tify that action."75 Syrian, Jordanian, and Libyan delegates, among others, 
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supported the Philippines' amendment, stating that there could be cases where 
a parachutist might use his weapon. The proposal failed to obtain the required 
two~thirds majority and was consequently not adopted.76 
What Protection is to be Granted to Airmen in Distress 
after They Have Parachuted to the Ground? 
An airman parachuting in distress who, on landing, is rendered hOTs de com~ 
. bat on account of wounds he incurred or by virtue of being unconscious is 
clearly entitled to the same protection as any other combatant in that situa~ 
tion. A question arises, however, of whether the airman should be entitled to 
any special protection beyond that granted to all combatants. The justification 
for such extra protection is set out by de Preux, who writes that "The intent to 
surrender is assumed to exist in an airman whose aircraft has been brought 
down, and any attack should be suspended until the person concerned has had 
an opportunity of making this intention known."77 
The 1969 Conference of Experts did not specifically address this issue, but at 
the subsequent 1971 Conference of Experts, the Israeli expert proposed a rule 
stating: 
Ainnen in distress shall be given, upon reaching the ground, a reasonable 
opportunity to lay down their anns and surrender.7S 
He explained his proposal by stating that "the situation of an airman on the 
ground, after having bailed out involuntarily from his aircraft is similar to per~ 
sons in distress at sea."79 The text proposed by the ICRC for the 1972 Confer~ 
ence of Experts refrained from adopting the proposal. However, the U.S. 
experts proposed a similar rule: 
They (ainnen parachuting in distress) shall, if they have landed in territory 
controlled by their enemy, and are not in a hostile attitude, be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to surrender. so 
The ICRC again refrained from incorporating such a rule in the text that it 
proposed in 1973 to the Humanitarian Law Conference. In introducing the 
text in the s.econd session of the Conference, the ICRC representative stated 
that "once they had reached the ground, all airmen should be afforded the 
same safeguards as during their descent by parachute."SI This would seem to 
have been an excessively far~reaching protection, as during their descent the 
rule is an absolute prohibition of attack. No delegation appears to have raised 
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this issue. In the same second session of the Conference, Israel again proposed 
the rule that: 
Upon reaching the ground, such person shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity to surrender.82 
The issue was transferred to a Working Group, which suggested the follow, 
ing text: 
Upon reaching the ground in territory controlled by an adverse party, a 
person who has parachuted from an aircraft in distress shall be given an 
opportunity to surrender before being made the object of attack, unless it is 
apparent that he is engaged in a hostile act.83 
The Rapporteur's comment on the text was that 
The Committee decided not to try to define what constituted a hostile act, 
but there was considerable support for the view that an airman who was 
aware of the presence of enemy armed forces and tried to escape was 
engaging in a hostile act. On the other hand, merely moving in the direction 
of his own lines would not, by itself, mean that that he should not be given an 
opportunity to surrender, for he might not know in which direction he was 
going or that he was visible to enemy armed forces.84 
This text, which was similar to the 1972 U.S. proposal, was subsequently 
adopted by Committee III and the Plenary without any further substantial 
debate. It would be a reasonable surmise that the relative lack of controversy 
over this rule was due to its less than absolute nature. Introducing phrases such 
as the reference to who controls the territory of the landing and not 
committing "a hostile act" presumably made the rule more acceptable to some 
States. This contrasts with the controversy over the rule as to protection during 
descent, one which was made absolute and not subject to such limitations. 
Conclusion 
The atmosphere at the Humanitarian Law Conference, which took place 
between 1973 and 1977, was strongly affected by "anti,American and 
anti, Western sentiment resulting from the war in Vietnam. There was vocal 
Third World support for National Liberation Movements and Arab and Third 
World support for the Palestinian cause. These elements combined to tilt the 
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balance against classical law of war. I believe that Protocol I has done a disser~ 
vice to international law by weakening the all~importarit distinction between 
combatants and non~combatants and by indirectly introducing ideas of just 
and unjust wars into jus in bellum. 
Concerning protection of airmen in distress, Protocol I has, however, clearly 
enunciated and elucidated an important principle of customary international 
law. The reason for the surprising clear headedness of the Conference on this 
subject may well be the conservative nature of military legal advisers. While 
fighting wars of "National Liberation" may seem to military men an esoteric 
manifestation of UN political jargon, protection of aircrews is real life. At~ 
tending the Conference one felt that, on the issue of aircrews, it was lawyers 
from JAG departments and military officers who set the tone. It is interesting in 
this context to note that Egypt, at the later stages of the Conference, departed 
ranks from the other Arab States and participated in the drafting of the provi~ 
sion. The close contact between the u.S. delegation and the Egyptian delega~ 
tion at the Conference may well have been a herald of the future Egyptian 
association with the United States and the subsequent Egyptian~Israeli Peace 
Treaty. 
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